The Emergency: The Initial Years

A very important aspect of the imposition of the Emergency was the reaction of the people.
While a section of the intelligentsia were markedly hostile to it, the large majority of Indians did not immediately understand what this unprecedented step meant. They responded to it with apathy and passivity, acquiescence and obedience; in some cases they even welcomed and supported it but were not overenthusiastic. There were no spontaneous protests, or strikes and demonstrations against the arrest of the opposition leaders as had been the case in August 1942. Only some sporadic, though sometimes heroic, instances of protest by word or deed were registered;  a few printed or cyclostyled leaflets appeared in a few places. There was some organized resistance by groups in Bihar; a few members of Jan Sangh in Delhi and of Akali Dal in Punjab courted arrest. CPM organized a few demonstrations in Kerala; however, it soon gave up when its leaders were arrested but soon released.

Most of the votaries of Total Revolution went quiet and the JP movement just 'melted away'. This was reflected in JP's despair at the lack of public protest and the manner in which the people had meekly accepted the Emergency.

Of course, the passive acceptance of the Emergency and even its slight popularity among some lasted through only its early phase. With the passage of time, the Emergency regime became increasingly unpopular and opposition to it began to take root in large parts of the country. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the Emergency in the initial stages has to be explained.

Why were the people reconciled to and even welcomed the Emergency and the hard steps that went with it so readily? Why did democracy collapse so easily? Why were Mrs Gandhi's orders obeyed so completely? Why was the faith of Morarji Desai and JP belied, that the people would not let Mrs Gandhi do what she did? Why did the instruments of administration, including the Army, fall in line 'with a dictatorship without demur', as one commentator was to ask later. And why was there no significant resistance to the government for a considerable period of time?  To these may be added another significant question. Why was the Emergency experience forgotten so easily so that Mrs Gandhi, who got a drubbing in March 1977 elections, could come back to power at the end of 1979?

There are no single answers to these questions. A few easy explanations suggest themselves. For one, the situation was unprecedented. Most of the people had no experience in recent memory, since in independence, of authoritarian rule, especially of strict press censorship. Moreover the very strength of Emergency lay in its suddenness and broad sweep. People were taken by surprise and were stunned and bewildered, as they did not expect that a national, constitutionally-elected government would or could impose an undemocratic regime. The news blackout added to their confusion.

The JPM(Jayprakash Movement) was also less popular and Mrs Gandhi not that unpopular outside or even in Bihar than JP and many of his followers believed, or as some of the newspapers portrayed. That JP was leading a 1942-type movement or that the Indian people were in a revolutionary mood was simply untrue. JP was, in fact, living in a world of his own creation. Furthermore, the lightening arrest of 26 June(day on which Emergency was imposed) had paralyzed the leadership of the JPM.

Many intellectuals, many among the politicized, and many on the left, who were used to organizing popular protest movements, had, despite their misgivings, another reason for at least their lukewarm response to the Emergency regime or being neutral towards it. It was the communal right which was the chief target of massive government repression. Apart from the arrest of the JP and some other opposition leaders, the main edge of the Emergency's repressive measures seemed to be almost entirely directed against anti-social elements or against the extreme communal right and the far-left Naxalites, who enjoyed little popular support before the Emergency and who were in any case known to be averse to democracy. All the twenty-six organizations banned, for example, were communal or left extremists. Most of those arrested, except for JP and some opposition leaders and Sarvodayites, were the militants and active sympathizers of the banned organizations. No action as such was taken against the major secular or left opposition parities. Their top leaders and cadres were by and large left untouched, and the few lower level leaders who were arrested were soon released. Moreover Mrs Gandhi and the government media consistently, from the beginning, played upon the theme that the communalists, in general, and the fascist and undemocratic RSS in particular were the main targets of the Emergency. They also emphasized the active role the RSS played in the JP movement. But, more than these, a large number of people were impressed by the immediate positive outcome of the well-publicized measures of the Emergency. It was another matter that most of these measures could have been taken in the normal course of governance, without an Emergency. Some of these 'gains of Emergency ' were appreciated by the poor, who believed that Mrs Gandhi was working for their welfare; others were appreciated by the middle and upper classes. Most of the 'improvements', however, proved to be short-lived and were overshadowed by the 'excuses' of the Emergency.

Also the situation in the country before June 1975 was not normal and most people were not averse to hard steps being taken. A large number of people were disgusted with the breakdown of the law and order and administration. People were tired of 'apparently pointless confrontations' perpetual agitations, campaigns of mass civil disobedience, bandhs, gheraos, demonstrations, strikes and street violence, and students' and teachers' strikes and agitations, which had brought normal work in the universities and colleges to a standstill and created a disorderly atmosphere on the campuses. Many used the words 'chaos' and 'anarchy' to describe the pre-Emergency situation.

Suddenly, with the imposition of the Emergency, peace and public order were restored. Crime and hooliganism in the cities came down. Strikes, bandhs, sit-ins and gheraos, and mass demonstrations and rallies ended. There was perceptible lessening of tension in the air. Calm was restored on the campuses as students and teachers went back to classrooms, and examinations were held on time. After the turmoil of previous years industrial peace prevailed. There was a noticeable improvement in social discipline, for example, people stood in queues at bus stops and ration-shops, cities bore a cleaner look, traffic in the cities moved in an orderly fashion. The popular acceptance of the Emergency and relief at the improvements in discipline were reflected in Vinoba Bhave's description of the Emergency as 'Anusashan Parva' or the Era of Discipline.

Quick, well-publicized and stern action, stalled earlier by the courts, was taken on a large scale and in a determined fashion against smugglers, hoarders, black marketeers, illegal traders in foreign exchange and tax evaders. Several thousand of them were put behind bars under the MISA and their illegally acquired property was confiscated. Especially popular was the anti-smuggling drive under which nearly two thousand smugglers, including smuggling-kings like Haji Mastan and Yusuf Patel, were put behind bars, seriously disorganizing smuggling activities. Many well-reported income-tax raids led to the unearthing of large amounts of black money, while nearly Rs. 1,600 crore of concealed income was voluntarily disclosed. To check tax evasion, several luxury flats in Bombay and Delhi were raided. Upper ceilings was placed on ownership of vacant urban land to discourage concentration of land and speculation in real estate. Investment in luxury housing was checked by placing a limit on the plinth area of new houses.

J&K: Reverse swing

New Delhi’s interlocutors for Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) are back in the news. Last week, there were some media reports that they had recommended the restoration of pre-1953 status for the state. In the wake of these reports, there was uproar in the state legislative assembly. The Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies staged a walkout, branding the reported recommendation as “anti-India” and demanding that the central government reject it out of hand. As of this writing, it is not clear if the interlocutors have indeed made such a recommendation. Nevertheless, it is important to understand what the restoration of the pre-1953 status means and why it is likely to feature in any serious effort to address the Kashmir problem.

The issue of Kashmir’s autonomy, including the pre-1953 status, has been the subject of much myth-making. On the one hand, the Sangh Parivar and its associates have for long demanded the wholesale abrogation of Article 370, never mind reverting to pre-1953 status. Article 370, they claim, inhibits the “complete integration” of the state with India. From a historical and constitutional standpoint, this is utterly untenable. On the other hand, champions of Kashmir’s cause present even pre-1953 status as little more than an effort by New Delhi to whittle down the state’s autonomy. To be sure, successive central governments are responsible for reducing the state’s autonomy to a cruel joke. But the pre-1953 arrangements remain an important attempt at reconciling the autonomy of Kashmir with the imperatives of the Indian constitution.

Let’s start from the beginning. The Maharaja of J&K acceded to the Indian Union in October 1947. The Instrument of Accession specified only three subjects for accession: foreign affairs, defence and communications. In March 1948, the Maharaja appointed an interim government in the state, with Sheikh Abdullah as prime minister. The interim government was also tasked with convening an Assembly for framing a constitution for the state. Meantime, the constituent assembly of India was conducting its deliberations. Sheikh Abdullah and three of his colleagues joined the Indian constituent assembly as members, and negotiated Kashmir’s future relationship with India. This led to the adoption of Article 370 in the Indian constitution.

Article 370 restricted the Union’s legislative power over Kashmir to the three subjects in the Instrument of Accession. To extend other provisions of the Indian constitution, the state government’s prior concurrence would have to be obtained. Further, this concurrence would have to be upheld by the constituent assembly of Kashmir, so that the provisions would be reflected in the state’s constitution. This implied that once Kashmir’s constituent assembly met, framed the state’s constitution, and dissolved, there could be no further extension of the Union’s legislative power. It was thus that the state’s autonomy was guaranteed by the Indian constitution.

Another provision of Article 370 is worth underlining. Article 370(1)(c) explicitly mentions that Article 1 of the Indian constitution applies to Kashmir through Article 370. Article 1 lists the states of the Union. This means that it is Article 370 that binds the state of J&K to the Indian Union. The removal of Article 370 would render the state independent of India. There was a good reason why the article was framed in this fashion. In 1949, when these discussions took place, it was likely a plebiscite would be held in the state. The framers of the Indian constitution had to take into account the possibility that they may have to let go of J&K. The Sangh Parivar’s demand for removing Article 370 betrays their naiveté and ignorance.

The constituent assembly of Kashmir met for the first time in November 1951. Even as it got down to its work, Abdullah wanted to depose the Maharaja and end dynastic rule in Kashmir. Jawaharlal Nehru had no love lost for the Maharaja. But the move to depose the ruler raised serious constitutional issues; for the Maharaja was recognised by the President of India. More important, it underscored the need to settle the broad principles governing the relationship between Kashmir and India. This was necessary to ensure that Kashmir’s constitution consorted smoothly with that of India. Following intense negotiations, Nehru and Abdullah concluded an accord in July 1952.

Under the “Delhi Agreement” the union’s authority would be confined to the three subjects of accession; the residuary powers would be vested in the Kashmir government. The residents of the state would be citizens of India but the state legislature would define and regulate their rights and privileges. The head of the state would be recognised by the President of India on the recommendation of the state legislature. Delhi could only exercise emergency powers on the request of the state government. These were the contours of the “pre-1953” autonomous status for Kashmir.

Unfortunately, the accord failed to hold following the rift between Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah (which resulted in the latter’s imprisonment). Thereafter, successive Indian governments sought to shore up their slipping hold on Kashmir by creatively undermining the state’s autonomy. For instance, by a gross misuse of Article 370’s provisions the central government continued to extend its powers over Kashmir by merely seeking the approval of pliant state legislatures. New Delhi argued that since the constituent assembly of Kashmir had wound up in November 1956, the powers granted to that body should be vested in the state legislature. The intention of the framers of the constitution was, of course, just the opposite. What is worse, this reading was upheld by the Supreme Court, thereby making a mockery of Article 370.

Any sincere attempt to bridge the gulf between India and Kashmir will have to undo this travesty. The autonomy report advanced by the National Conference government in 1999 made some concrete suggestions in this regard. It candidly accepted that not all the presidential orders made under Article 370 since 1953 need to be rescinded. The important thing was to reaffirm and uphold the principle that constitutional limits ought to be respected. The Delhi Agreement of 1952 could yet provide a useful starting point.

* Srinath Raghavan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

• March 24, 2011